Before I underwrote your deal, I lived through my own.

Colleyville is one of the strongest suburbs in the Dallas–Fort Worth metro, and this was a $1.46M flip — the kind of high-basis deal that shows what a lender is actually made of. We funded it on 818's own paper: our credit decision, our capital.

I underwrote it the way I'd underwrite my own project — basis against real renovated comps, the sponsor's history on prior flips, and a draw schedule that protects both sides through the rehab. At seven figures, the after-repair comp set is the entire deal; an optimistic exit number is where these go wrong.

It closed clean. The sponsor got speed and certainty; we kept a loan we are comfortable holding.

DC's inner submarkets — Petworth, 16th Street Heights — have been some of the most reliable flip markets in the country. This was a $1M+ rowhouse for a sponsor I'd funded before, structured as a full interest-only bridge: 90% of acquisition and 100% of the rehab draws.

Repeat borrowers are where a lender earns its keep. You've seen the contractor relationships, you know whether they hit timelines, and you can structure off that history instead of guessing. I placed this with an institutional capital partner at terms that let the sponsor recycle equity straight into the next project.

Maximum leverage only works when the underwriting beneath it is conservative. The leverage was aggressive; the comp set and the draw controls were not.

Sedona is one of the premier short-term-rental markets in the Southwest — constrained supply, year-round tourism, and nightly rates a long-term lease can't touch. This was a 30-year DSCR loan that qualified the property on its own income.

DSCR is where the operator's eye matters most: you're underwriting an income stream, so the realism of the revenue assumption is everything. I'd rather normalize the short-term-rental revenue conservatively and have the deal pencil through a slow month than chase a peak-season number that evaporates.

It funded. The owner locked in long-term financing on a proven income property — no tax-return underwrite required.

Fort Worth's infill neighborhoods are bread-and-butter flip territory — attainable basis, real buyer demand at the exit, and margins that only work if the acquisition number is right. This was a sub-$250K flip I originated and structured.

Small deals get sloppy underwriting because the dollars feel forgiving — they aren't. I underwrote the basis against renovated comps within the immediate pocket, not the ZIP, and set the draw schedule to the actual scope. The percentage math is identical to a seven-figure deal; the margin for a soft comp is thinner.

It closed on schedule. The operator got the certainty they came for, and the file stands up to the same scrutiny as anything three times its size.

Burleson sits on the growth edge south of Fort Worth — good rooftops, active buyers, but a market where the specific block matters more than the metro trend. This was a ~$200K flip that needed a real look, not a rubber stamp.

A clean deal is easy to fund; the job is knowing which imperfect ones are still good deals. I underwrote to the specifics of the property and structured the loan so the risk sat where it belonged, then originated and placed it. The answer was yes — earned, not assumed.

It funded and closed. Exactly the kind of deal a checkbox lender passes on and an operator-underwriter gets done.

The 16th Street corridor is one of the most durable flip submarkets in DC — walkable, supply-constrained, and deep with buyers at the renovated price point. This was a $1M+ rowhouse, originated and structured, and placed with an institutional capital partner.

At this basis the after-repair comp set is the whole deal — an optimistic exit number is where seven-figure flips go wrong. I underwrote the exit conservatively and built the draw controls to protect the rehab, then placed the capital at terms that kept the sponsor moving.

It closed clean. Another data point in a corridor I underwrite from memory, not from a spreadsheet template.

Fort Myers has been one of the stronger Gulf-Coast rental markets — population inflow, a real renter base, and multifamily that trades on in-place income. This was a 33-unit deal I originated and structured, then placed with an institutional capital partner built for the asset class.

Multifamily at this size is an operating business, not a house with more doors. I underwrote the actual rent roll, the expense load, and the path to stabilized income — then matched it to a capital source whose terms fit a multi-year hold instead of a quick flip. Getting the right lender on the right asset is half the value of a desk like ours.

It closed. The sponsor got institutional multifamily execution without assembling the lender relationships themselves — that is exactly what 818 is for.

Silver Spring is a mature, high-value submarket just outside DC, and this was a seven-figure bridge on a transitional property — a situation where the value is in the plan, not yet in the operating statement.

Bridge lending is a bet on execution: you underwrite the sponsor's plan, the timeline, and the takeout as hard as you underwrite today's numbers. I structured the loan around the business plan and placed it with an institutional capital partner that lends on transitional risk, so the sponsor had certainty of close on a deal a conventional lender would have stalled.

It closed. A reminder that the hardest deals to fund are often the best ones — they just need a lender who reads the whole picture.